Entertainment and Travel Costs (ETC), an expenditure item in standard accounting books of firms in China, amount to about 20% of total wage bills in a sample of 3470 Chinese firms. Using a detailed dataset of these firms, we analyze the composition of ETC and effects of ETC on firm performance. We develop a simple model of managerial decisions on the amount of entertainment expenditures to spend on strengthening relational capital with suppliers and clients, bribing government officials, and private consumption. This model allows us to identify components of ETC by examining how they should respond to different environmental variables. We find strong evidence that firms' ETC compromise a mix that includes expenditures on government officials both as "grease money" and "protection money," expenditures to build relational capital with suppliers and clients, and managerial private consumption. Overall, ETC have significantly negative effects on firm performance, but their negative effects can be much less pronounced when their marginal returns are higher, particularly, under severe government expropriation and when the quality of government service is very poor.
INTRODUCTION
Corruption is a central issue in development, political economy and transition economics, yet few studies provide systematic hard evidence of it. By its very nature, objective data on corruption are difficult to come by. With few exceptions, researchers have resorted to indices of perceived corruption across countries or micro-level surveys based on self-reporting by managers or government officials.
1 While useful for some purposes, such data can suffer from a number of biases (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001 ).
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While finding reliable measures of corruption with solid data is important in and of itself, it is perhaps more important to figure out the causes and effects of corruption. Corruption is a product of bad institutions, broadly defined, but which kinds of weak institutions are more likely to breed corruption? To use the dichotomy of Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) , when "property rights institutions" are weak and firms are subject to constant expropriation by government officials, firms are forced to pay bribes in exchange for protection or less expropriation. In such cases corruption has no productive role and only increases social waste. 3 On the other hand, when "contracting institutions" are weak, in the sense that governments do not provide services at the level that facilitates trade and commerce, such as slow license approvals or erratic contract enforcement, firms are induced to bribe government officials to do what they are supposed to do. Some scholars argue corruption such as this, which "greases the wheel," can increase social welfare by "making things work" in an otherwise rigid and stifling bureaucratic system (e.g., Lui, 1985) . Others counter that corruption makes things worse because firms and government officials cannot "trade efficiently"
(e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) . This debate clearly cannot be settled without compelling empirical evidence. Unfortunately, due to the limitations of data on corruption, the empirical work has shed little light on the causes of corruption and on the theoretical debate about its effects.
Using a comprehensive dataset with a large sample of firms from China, we adopt a novel approach to identify corruption and its causes. Specifically, we study an expenditure item in the accounting books of Chinese firms called "Entertainment and Travel Costs" (ETC), which is predominantly composed of expenditures on eating, drinking, Karaoke, sports club membership, and travel. We develop a simple model of managerial decisions on the amount of entertainment expenditures to spend on strengthening relational capital with suppliers and clients, bribing government officials, and private consumption. This model allows us to identify components of ETC by examining how they should respond to different environmental variables. We find compelling evidence that corrupt payments to government officials account for a significant portion of entertainment expenditures. Moreover, our findings suggest that firms pay bribes both to buy protection against government expropriation and to grease the wheel in buying government services.
Correspondingly, the more severe the government expropriation and the worse the quality of government services, the more ETC contributes to firm performance.
There are several reasons why we focus on entertainment expenditures. First, the magnitude of ETC is large. For the 3,470 firms in our dataset, on average each firm spends 946,400 Chinese
Yuan (more than 110 thousand U.S. dollars) annually on ETC, which is about 20% of the average firm's total wage bill, about 2.6% of its total sales, and 4.0% of its total value added. Even though we do not know of any comparable data on entertainment expenditures of firms in other economies, these numbers suggest that ETC are an important phenomenon in Chinese firms and may be excessive relative to normal business needs. 4 A second reason to study ETC is that the accounting category of "Entertainment and Travel Costs" in China is a very easy place to disguise corruption due to extremely lax accounting regulations and enforcement. In addition, entertainment providers are gladly willing to produce any kind of receipt clients would like. Entertainment expenditures are widely believed to be corrupt. As a result, the central government has numerous times unsuccessfully attempted to curb such practices. 5 A third reason we focus on ETC to study corruption is that entertainment expenditures are a hard accounting measure. These expenditures are legal and show up 4 The fact that firms spend large amounts of money on entertainment should not be surprising to observers of China. It is consistent with other available estimates. For example, Hu (2004) estimates that in 1997 Chinese firms and government agencies spent more than 200 billion Yuan (about 25 billions U.S. dollars) on eating and drinking, and another 283.5 billion Yuan (about 34 billion U.S. dollars) on tourism and oversea travel. Firms were responsible for the lion's share of these expenditures (for their interactions, it is more likely that firms entertain the governments than vice versa). These entertainment expenditures of 484 billion Yuan account for about 6.5 percent of China's GDP (about 7.4 trillion Yuan) and represent roughly 60 percent of the total national tax revenue in 1997. Recent news reports in fact suggest that such expenditures have only increased over time.
in the firms' accounting books; managers must present receipts to get reimbursed. In contrast to the problems inherent in surveys which quiz managers directly about bribery, there is both little incentive and flexibility for managers to misreport on entertainment expenditures. 6 However, entertainment expenditures likely contain both legitimate business expenses in addition to illegitimate ones. How can one then identify corruption from those expenditures? Our strategy is the following. We postulate that entertainment expenditures can fit into three different categories: (i) normal business expenditures such as on those which build relationships with suppliers and clients; (ii) manager own consumptions such as taking family and friends to restaurants, clubs, and recreation; and (iii) corruption payments to government officials. With a simple theoretical model, we derive predictions of how ETC respond to changes in firm characteristics and the business environments (e.g., government expropriation and service quality), and what effects ETC have on firm performance if a significant portion of ETC is used to serve each of the three functions.
Specifically, our model indicates that if firms are subject to severe government expropriation and are forced to spend money entertaining government officials as a means of bribery, then ETC will be higher for firms more prone to expropriation. If a city government is inefficient and refrains from providing good services, firms in the city have to spend more on entertaining government officials to "get things done." In contrast, if entertainment expenditures are not spent as bribery to government officials, then ETC should be decreasing in government expropriation or increasing in government service quality.
Using our dataset of over 3,000 firms, we test these predictions to infer whether a significant portion of ETC can be accounted for as corrupt payments to government officials. 7 We find that ETC is higher when government expropriation (proxied by the effective tax burden) is more severe, and when the quality of government service is lower. Both effects are statistically significant. By the identification results of our model, these findings show that corrupt payments to government officials account for a significant portion of entertainment expenditures. Moreover, they also suggest that firms pay bribes both to buy protection against government expropriation and to grease the wheel in 6 However, it is common for firms and government agencies in China to have off-balance-sheet accounts. Some entertainment expenditures, especially those that look more suspicious, are paid from those accounts. Thus, our measure of entertainment expenditures underestimates the actual entertainment expenditures of the firms in our sample. Actual managerial own consumption and corruption spending in entertainment expenditures are probably more significant than what we identify. 7 In this study we use a narrow definition of corruption that includes only entertainment type bribes firms pay to government officials in exchange for protection or services. Though excessive entertainment expenditures by managers on themselves and their family and friends are often called as "fraud" or "corruption" in China, especially when done by managers of state-owned firms, here they are classified as managerial perks.
buying government services. These findings are further reinforced in our analysis of the effects of ETC on firm performance. Overall, ETC affect firm profits and productivity adversely. But the effects of ETC are significantly less pronounced where the tax burden is higher, strongly suggesting that ETC are spent to reduce government expropriation. Our estimates suggest that, once the endogeneity of ETC is accounted for, for firms whose tax burdens are one standard deviation higher than the average firm of the sample, the negative effect of ETC on profitability is reduced by 10%
(in absolute value) 8 and that on productivity reduced by 14%. Similarly, for firms that face government officials offering services one standard deviation worse than the average, the negative effect of ETC on profitability drops by 30 percent and that on productivity drops by 17 percent. In summary, our empirical results show that a large portion of entertainment expenditures by Chinese firms is corruption payments to government officials, both as protection money and grease money.
We also find evidence that a significant portion of entertainment expenditures is used productively to conduct business and build relational capital with suppliers and clients. Specifically, firms that sell their main products to other provinces spend more on entertainment than those who do not, suggesting that entertainment expenditures increase in transportation costs and greater difficulties in maintaining long-distance relationships. 9 Moreover, the length of time that firms have known their main suppliers and clients has a negative, though not statistically significant, effect on ETC, and has a significantly negative effect on ETC's contribution to firm performance. The latter finding suggests that for firms without long-term relationships with their main suppliers and clients, money spent on entertainment can be good investments. Together, these findings indicate that firms spend on entertainment to build relationships with suppliers and clients.
Not all entertainment expenditures, however, are used by managers to advance the interests of their firms. Our analysis also uncovers evidence supporting the view that a big chunk of entertainment expenditures is spent to satisfy managers themselves. Overall, ETC are found to have significantly negative effects on firm profits and productivity, suggesting that there is a strong managerial own consumption component of entertainment expenditures. However, the negative effects of ETC are much reduced for firms with greater private ownership and for firms that have fired a manager in the previous 4 years. Once the endogeneity of ETC is accounted for, increasing private ownership by one standard deviation reduces the negative effects of ETC on productivity by 9 8 We use the same convention in the rest of the Introduction.
9 Alternatively, some of this effect could arise because firms doing business in other provinces may have to pay additional bribes to government officials in those provinces. This will strengthen our main points on corruption.
percent, and on productivity by 17 percent. Similarly, increasing the likelihood of managerial dismissal by one standard deviation reduces the negative effects of ETC on productivity by 31 percent, and on productivity by 15 percent. One interpretation of this finding is that private firms and firms that have fired a manager in the previous four years have better corporate governance and place greater emphasis on profit when evaluating managers. Following this logic, our regression results suggest that as managers become more profit-oriented, they use entertainment expenditures more for productive uses. Overall, our findings indicate that a significant portion of ETC goes toward managers' own consumption.
Our findings shed light on the relationship between economic growth, corporate governance and institutions. In the case of China, both property rights institutions and contracting institutions, or more specifically, non-expropriating and efficient city governments, are important for economic growth. Across firms, improved corporate governance curbs managerial excess. Since ETC are a significant expenditure item for firms and have significantly negative overall effects on firm performance, more attention should be paid to monitoring them better and making them more accountable. Possible measures include improving accounting regulations and enforcement, making them more transparent, and auditing of entertainment expenditures by firms as well as government agencies more intensively.
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Our paper belongs to a growing empirical literature on corruption that uses micro-level data.
Within this literature, Di Tella and Schargrosky (2003) is the only paper that uses hard measures.
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The authors find that hospital input prices in Buenos Aires are negatively correlated with wages and auditing intensity, suggesting bribe-taking behavior of hospital procurement officers. Using information on bribery reported by a sample of 176 Ugandan firms, Svensson (2003) finds firms' choices to bribe or not depend on their regulatory environments, while their bribing payments depend on their "ability to pay" and their bargaining positions relative to government officials. Using the same dataset of Ugandan firms, Fisman and Svensson (2002) show that bribery has large negative effects on firm growth. Clarke and Xu (2004) use enterprise-level data on bribes paid to utilities in 21 transitional countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and find that corruption systematically 10 Of course, this is not to say that the central government is not corrupt and that just by imposing central regulation the problem can be solved.
11 Although not trying to measure corruption, Fisman (2001) provides a clever estimation of the value of relationships with governments to firms in Indonesia.
varies with characteristics of bribe takers and givers in economically intuitive ways. 12 Kaufmann and Wei (1998) In addition to considering corruption, our paper also sheds light on managerial perks. In this sense it is closely related to Rajan and Wulf (2004) , who examine managerial on-the-job consumption. As they point out, there is little empirical work on managerial perks in the existing literature, despite a great deal of attention from theory and from the public about managerial incentives and compensations. With a sample of 300 large U.S. corporations, the authors find mixed evidence for the view that perks are managers' private benefits, but more compelling evidence that perks are a means to enhance productivity. Consistent with Rajan and Wulf (2004) , we find that a significant portion of ETC spent in our sample is used to bribe government officials, a corrupt activity that may be socially wasteful but beneficial to firms. On the other hand, we also find evidence that a significant portion of ETC are spent toward the private benefit of managers. In fact, overall, ETC have a negative effect on firm profit and productivity. The difference between our findings and those of Rajan and Wulf (2004) likely reflects the different qualities of corporate governance of firms in China and the U.S., and the different institutional environments within which they operate.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple model to illustrate our identification strategy. Section 3 describes our data and presents descriptive statistics.
In Section 4, we examine the determinants of total entertainment expenditures. Section 5 investigates how entertainment expenditures affect firm performance, and Section 6 concludes. Image that the firm has a potential profit opportunity 0 Q > .
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
14 The probability that Q can be realized, or, equivalently, how much of Q can be realized, is denoted by ( )
This probability depends on both cooperation from government officials and from the firm's 13 The magnitudes of managerial perks differs greatly between firms in the U.S. and in China. According to Rajan and Wulf (2004) , Hewitt Associates, a leading human resource consulting firm in the U.S., estimates the value of CEO perks at approximately 1 to 3 percent of total CEO compensation. In contrast, even if only 20 percent of entertainment expenditures are managerial perks in our sample, they would account for 4 percent of the firms' total wage bills. Hence, total managerial perks, which include valuable items such as luxury cars and company condominiums, must be quite substantial relative to their monetary compensation.
14 In our empirical analysis, Q will be approximated by the firm's basic characteristics, such as its industry, number of 
Note that we make the realistic assumption that the tax base for Chinese firms is revenue, rather than gross profit.
We also reasonably assume that the "owner" of the firm observes only the total net profit Π and some noisy signal of the manager's own consumption, c x , but cannot directly distinguish corruption expenses from relationship building expenditures. 15 The firm owner decides in each period whether to retain the manager based on the current period net profit and the manager's own consumption, c x . 16 We assume that the probability that the manager is retained for the next period is given by For simplicity, let 0 V > be the manager's (constant) continuation value from being retained and let β be his discount factor. The manager in each period chooses ( , , , ) c r g p x x x x to maximize:
15 By firm "owner" we mean the party in the firm who decides on hiring and firing top managers. For corporations, this means the boards of directors; for state-owned firms, this means the government bureau supervising the firm; and for privately owned firms, the owner can be the manager or another private party. 16 For simplicity, we do not consider explicit incentive contracts here. It is easy to see that adding some profit-sharing, as long as it is not too large, in the manager's payoff function will not change the qualitative results of the model, but can complicate the analysis substantially. 
is the firm's cash flow gross of the manager's own consumption. This says that the manager will consume more himself if the firm's cash flow is greater. Not surprisingly, the manager's optimal self-consumption decreases in the monitoring intensity, c a , his discount factor β and his future value of employment, V .
The optimal levels of ( , , ) 
B. Suppose l a is positive and sufficiently large for
Part A of Proposition 1 is easy to understand. When 0 l a = , any positive level of expenditure on l x has no effect on revenue but decreases profit. Therefore the optimal expenditure on l x is zero. To understand the rest of Part A, consider the case l g
Suppose and r p a a are positive and sufficiently large.
It is easy to see from Equation (1) (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994 Theorem (Milgrom and Segal, 2002) . By Equation (5), * c x must always be increasing in g k .
Therefore, the total entertainment expenditure must be increasing in g k .
To understand Part B of Proposition 1, let us again consider the case l g = . When g a is positive and sufficiently large, the optimal level of g x will be positive. Since 0 g x > , we can use the
to rewrite the firm's cash flow ϕ from Equation (1) as (7) ( ) ( ) 
A is a collection of terms that are independent of g k . 19 Summing up the entertainment expenditures of all categories, we have
Clearly the total entertainment expenditures are decreasing in g k . The analysis of the cases of l r = and l p = is analogous. 18 The explicit expression for
The explicit expression for is zero or sufficiently positive. This is exactly the empirical strategy we will follow.
Identification of the manager's own consumption, c x , is somewhat different. In fact, our specification of the manager's payoff function in Equation (3) We have so far illustrated the principles of our identification strategy by considering a representative firm. In the empirical implementation of the identification strategy, we rely on cross-firm variation along many dimensions. For example, profit opportunities, Q , among firms vary by industry, size, age, and market coverage. A firm's profit opportunities are also correlated with its home city's level of economic development, which varies greatly in our sample. Firms vary greatly in their strength of private contracting relationship, r x , which we capture by the number of years a firm has done business with its clients and suppliers. To measure a firm's relational capital with government officials, we use a variable called "government help", which is the likelihood that government officials tend to be helpful to the firm, to proxy for the baseline quality of government service, g k . Firms in our sample also differ in ownership structure, managerial dismissal, and tax burden.. Exploiting the ideas summarized in Proposition 1, we infer the importance of the various components of the ETC by empirically examine how a firm's total ETC expenditures are affected by firm characteristics and environment variables.
-14 - ETC represent a significant portion of firms' expenditures. The ratio of ETC to total wage bill at the firm level has a median of 8.8%, and a mean of 19 percent (for the subsample excluding the top 5 percent of the firms on this ratio). The ratio of ETC to value-added has a median of 1.8 percent and a mean of 4.0 percent. 26 In our empirical analysis, we normalize Entertainment and
DATA AND MEASUREMENTS
Travel Costs by total sales, and define the ratio as ETC/Sales. This variable has a median of 1 percent, and a mean of 2.6 percent in our data. 27 ETC/Sales varies substantially across firms, with a sample standard deviation of 6.2 percent. Across cities, the average ETC/Sales ratio ranges from 0.8 percent in Jiangmeng, a coastal and relatively affluent city, to 5 percent in Guiyang, an inland and relatively backward city. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in our analysis. Table 2 displays a cross-city comparison of major variables. The cross-city comparisons of the ETC/Sales ratio show some interesting patterns. First, the ETC/Sales ratio is on average lower in more developed cities. Figure 1 shows a clear negative relationship between the mean ETC/Sales Ratio and the logarithm of per capita GDP at the city level. Figure 2 plots the standard deviation of ETC/Sales ratio within the 25 There can be at least two reasons for such widespread losses among firms. First, Chinese firms hide a substantial amount of profits to evade taxes (Liu and Xiao, 2004) . Second, profit variation is enormous across firms, and the standard deviation is almost 7 times the value of the mean. This is consistent with the fact that some state-owned firms are extremely good at destroying value. Due to these reasons, one should be careful in interpreting our regression results using profit data, if one believes that profit hiding is correlated with the variables used in our analysis. We have no way to deal with such data problems, nor do we know whether and how profit hiding is correlated with other variables we use. The other variable of firm performance, productivity, which uses value added or sales data, is more immune to these problems and hence more reliable. As will be shown later, regression results using profit and productivity are qualitatively similar, which suggests that potential problems of profit data do not ruin the analysis.
city against the logarithm of per capita GDP. It is interesting to note that there are larger variations in the ETC/Sales ratio in less developed cities. Thus, less developed cities feature both higher levels of the ETC/Sales ratio and higher variances. Importantly, GDP per capita differs greatly among the cities. The ratio of the maximum per capita income in Shenzhen to the minimum in Chaoyang is almost 14.
[ Table 1 about Here]
[ Table 2 about Here]
[Figure 1-2 About Here]
In our empirical analysis, we proxy the baseline government quality g k each firm faces by the firm's evaluation of the tendency of government officials to help firms, and we hereafter call this government help. 28 Government help is a firm-specific measure of government helpfulness that depends on the overall government quality and the relational capital each firm has with government officials. Bounded between zero and one, Government help differs greatly across the cities, ranging from 21% to 82%. Figure 3 graphs ETC/Sales against government help at the city level. Clearly, in cities with better government help, firms tend to spend less on ETC.
[Figure 3 about here]
The baseline government expropriation p k that each firm faces is proxied for by the firm's total tax burden in the previous year, which we think represents the extent of government expropriation if the manager does not spend additional entertainment money bribing government officials. 29 For several reasons, there is a substantial amount of variation in the tax burdens among firms in China. First, central government tax rates differ across firm types (e.g., tax incentives to 28 Specifically, the variable is based on the answer to the following question: "Among the government officials that your firm regularly interacts with, what is the percentage that tends to help the firm develop?"
29 That is, consistent with our model, we assume that firms are in the stationary state of their dynamic optimization problem, where every period they respond to the stochastic environment shocks.
attract foreign investments) and across regions (e.g., negotiations between the central government and provinces, tax reductions for special economic zones). Second, in the same city, the city government often imposes different levels of local taxes. Third, tax law enforcement and collection efforts differ greatly across cities and across firms within each city, so a firm's actual tax burden depends on the level of vigilance of local tax officials and the relationship its has with them. These reasons explain why the actual tax burden, as measured by total taxes divided by sales, varies so greatly across cities and across firms in the same city. Firms in our sample on average paid taxes equal to 7.1 percent of their total sales, with a standard deviation of 9.7 percent. The lowest average tax rate is found in Shenzhen at 3.8 percent, and the highest is Guiyang's 11 percent. Figure 4 plots ETC/Sales against the average tax burden at the city level. The graph shows a strong positive relationship, suggesting that ETC may be used to cushion the blunt of government expropriations.
[Figure 4 about here]
To measure a firm's baseline relational capital with its suppliers and clients, r k , we construct a variable called Years of Relationship, which is the sum of the years that the firm has known its most important supplier and the years that it has known its most important client. This variable shows substantial variation across cities, with a low of 7 years in Lanzhou on average to a high of 9.1 years on average in Dandong. The sample mean is 8.3 years, and the sample standard deviation is 2.1 years. In our regression, we use the logarithm of years of relationship. By Proposition 1, if managers use entertainment expenditures to build private contracting relationships, ETC should be negatively correlated with years of relationship; otherwise, ETC and years of relationship should be positively correlated. Figure 5 below plots ETC/Sales against the logarithm of years of relationship with contracting parties. There is a negative relationship, but it is not strong.
[ Figure 5 about here]
Undoubtedly, managerial incentives are important to understand entertainment expenditures.
However, the incentive structure for managers in Chinese firms is not at all transparent, and no good data are available on managerial incentives. 30 For our purpose, we use two measures of corporate 30 There are several reasons for this. Most firms in our sample are not public firms, so they do not have to disclose compensations for mangers. Moreover, there are numerous accounting tricks which allow managers of Chinese firms to governance to gauge how a manager's incentives are aligned with those of the firm. The first variable is "Private Ownership," which measures the share of a firm owned by private parties, both domestic and foreign. Motivated by profits, private owners are likely to have stronger incentives for monitoring managers to reduce waste and increase efficiency. In our sample, the share of private ownership varies across firms from 0 (purely state-owned) to 1 (purely private), and the intra-city average varies from 82 percent in Wenzhou, a coastal city known for its entrepreneurship, to 17 percent in Fushun and Shenyang, two Northeastern cities. The average firm in our sample has 34.8%
of private ownership, with a standard deviation of 45.5%. 
WHAT FIRMS SPEND MORE ETC?
In this section, we empirically examine the determinants of ETC, using regression specifications suggested by the simple model in Section 2. The dependent variable is the ETC/Sales ratio, and the list of included explanatory variables varies by specification. For each regression get paid without being noticed by outsiders. Even when explicit incentive schemes are observed, they are typically subject to ex post renegotiations so the actual incentives managers face are still murky (Cai, Li and Zhou, 2003) .
31 The opposite interpretation is also possible if firing senior managers indicates that things were very bad in a firm. Our empirical results do not seem to support this interpretation. Another alternative effect is that in a firm that fired a top manager before, the current manager may find it safer knowing that he is just hired. One thing to note, however, is that when we say a firm fired a top manager before, it does not mean that it fired the CEO of the firm. Thus, the current CEO may or may not be a replacement of some top manager fired before. Industry dummies are included to filter out industry-specific needs for normal business expenditures in entertainment and travel costs. GDP per capita at the city level controls for various aspects related to economic development. Alternatively, we also directly control for economic development with city dummies. The variable i Z is a vector of basic firm characteristics, including size (log of the number of employees) and age (log of firm age). The variable i X is a vector of firm-specific variables that include
(1) Business conditions and relational capital: a dummy variable for whether the firm sells to other provinces, the log of the number of years the firm has known its largest supplier and its largest client;
(2) Service quality of the government: government help, defined as the likelihood of government officials helping the firm in their interactions.
(3) Corporate governance: share of private ownership, a dummy variable for whether the firm fired any senior manager in the last four years.
(4) Government expropriation: lagged tax burden. The tax burden variable is once lagged to avoid contemporaneous bias.
In order to see if the results are sensitive to multicollinearity, we add variables step by step starting with basic firm characteristics and municipal GDP per capita. Moreover, in the last two columns, we include city dummies to more flexibly control for city characteristics. Since per capita GDP at the city level is embedded in the city dummies, we cannot include this variable in the last two columns when city dummies are included. We report the estimation results from 8 specifications in Table 3 . Since the estimates from different specifications differ little, we shall focus on the complete specification in column 5.
[ Table 3 To allow for the possibility that the once lagged tax burden may be endogenous, we experimented with the specification in column 6 that excludes the once lagged tax burden from the regression. A comparison of columns 5 and 6 reveals that the other coefficient estimates barely change, suggesting that there is no need to worry about the potential correlation of the once-lagged tax burden with the firm-specific error term. This is reassuring, and is consistent with our implicit stationarity assumption.
For the corporate governance variables, private ownership does not have a robust correlation with ETC/Sales. The indicator of previous managerial dismissal, however, has strong and positive effects on ETC/Sales. The coefficient is statistically significant across various specifications, and the magnitude is large. Other things being equal, the ratio of ETC/Sales in firms that fired a senior manager before is 0.8% higher than that in firms that did not, a 31% increase. If a firm that had fired a senior manager before indeed has better corporate governance, this finding is consistent with our model for the case of large a π (the weight on profit in the managerial evaluation system) and large ϕ (expected cash flow). It is also possible that managers at these firing firms tend to spend entertainment on productive uses much more than their peers at firms with poor corporate governance. This interpretation is reinforced by our results, to be presented later, that ETC/Sales has a significantly more positive effect on firm performance when the firm has fired a senior manager.
Thus, these findings suggest that a significant portion of entertainment expenditures are spent on the manager's own consumption.
Finally, firms which serve a larger market, as captured by the selling-to-other-provinces dummy variable, tend to have higher ETC/Sales. Other things being equal, the ratio of ETC/Sales in firms that sell to other provinces is 0.4%-05% higher than that in firms that do not. Though statistically insignificant, a firm's strength of private contracting relationship has a negative effect on ETC/Sales. By Proposition 1, these findings are consistent with the view that managers use entertainment expenditures to conduct business and to build relationships with suppliers and clients.
The results that control for city dummies are reported in column 7. Overall, the estimates of the other coefficients remain remarkably stable. The only noticeable difference is that the coefficient of government help becomes slightly smaller (from -0.006 to -0.005) and no longer statistically significant, with a t-stat of 1.33. This is not surprising since we expect that government help has a significant city dimension. 32 The coefficients on the city and industry dummies are also interesting. One may raise two concerns about the government help variable. First, it is a subjective measure based on managers' self reports. Second, it may be a function of how much a firm spends 32 When we regress government help on city dummies, the R squared is 0.173. Therefore, there are clearly both firmspecific and city-specific dimensions to these variables.
entertaining government officials. To address these concerns, we alternatively use a city's economic development level, measured by per capita GDP of the city, as a proxy for municipal government quality. Though a crude proxy itself, the city's per capita GDP does avoid these two problems of the government help variable. With this alternative proxy for government quality, all the main results (not reported here), including those on firm performance effects, are qualitatively the same.
Alternatively, one may wonder if ETC is entirely a form of implicit CEO pay for tax evasion or incentive purposes. 33 To investigate this possibility, we run the final specification in column 8 which includes two measures of CEO relative compensation. We take the ratio of CEO wages to the firm's average wage, and the average wage of the firm's mid-level managers. The ratios have means of 4.06 and 2.35, respectively. When we include these ratios in log form, ETC/Sales is not statistically correlated with either relative wage measure. The evidence therefore does not support the view that ETC is entirely a form of CEO pay. If it were true, we would expect a statistically significant negative relationship between CEO wages to ETC expenditures.
To summarize, following the identification strategy developed in our model, the evidence strongly supports the view that entertainment expenditures serve three functions: normal business expenditures, managerial own consumption, and corruption payments to government officials.
Moreover, bribes in the form of entertainment are used both for protection against excessive government expropriation and for grease money in exchange for better government services. In contrast, the evidence does not support that discretional ETC expenditures are used as a substitute mechanism for regulated CEO pay. While some of our proxies can allow other possible stories and one could come up with alternative explanations for ETC, we believe the results present a convincing case for our theory. This is further supported by the detailed analysis of the effects of ETC on firm performance in the next section.
ETC AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
In this section, we shed further light on the nature of ETC by examining ETC's impact on a firm's performance. If managers use ETC mainly for normal business needs and to build relationships with clients and suppliers, or to build relationships with government officials, the marginal return of ETC should respond to these variables as well.
To proxy for the performance of the firm, we use the ratio of profit to sales and the firm's total factor productivity. Specifically, we estimate the following two equations: When the dependent variable is log total value added, we include industry dummies interacted with log of the capital stock and log of the number of employees in the regressions. 34 This allows for sector-specific production functions, which is necessary since our sample spans a diverse set of sectors. In the regressions with the total value added as the dependent variable and with sectorspecific production functions, we can interpret the regression coefficient on ETC/Sales as the effect of ETC/Sales on total factor productivity (TFP). The specification of Equation (10) estimates the effect of ETC on firm performance after controlling for firm characteristics and the business environment. By including interaction terms of ETC and firm specific variables i X , the specification of Equation (11) allows for estimation of the effect of i X on the returns to ETC, because in that specification,
For the productivity estimates, we use both the value added and the output (sales) as the dependent variables. Using the Cobb-Douglas production function, the estimation results are qualitatively the same with the two dependent variables. We rely mainly on the value added estimation since it is more parsimonious and less subject to the multicollinearity problem. We allow for sector-specific coefficients for production factors, and adding one variable would amount to adding 14 coefficients for the Cobb-Douglas specification, and 56 coefficients for the translog specification. We shall also report the translog specification results for the value added estimation.
34 Capital stock is represented by the original value of fixed assets. Another measure of capital stock, the net value of fixed assets, has a correlation of 0.99 with our measure. Naturally, the results do not differ depending on this measure. All nominal figures are deflated with consumer price index.
It is likely that a firm's ETC are endogenous. For example, there may be omitted factors that both affect a firm's ETC and its performance. To instrument for ETC/Sales, we use the city-industry average of ETC/Sales and the district-industry average of ETC/Sales, 35 excluding the firm itself in computing the average. 36 We use both averages since firms interact with both city-and district-level governments, and therefore both instruments contain useful information on firm-level ETC/Sales.
Practically, we use the city-industry average ETC/Sales and its square, and the district-industry average ETC/Sales as instruments for ETC. 37 This choice of instrumental variables is justified by our theoretical model. In Section 2, we showed that a firm's "grease money" bribery to government officials, * g x , is a function of government service quality g k . To the extent that firms within the same city (or district) and industry face similar qualities of government service, their expenditures
x is a component of a firm's ETC, we thus expect that firms' total ETC will also be correlated within the same group. This instrumental variable argument is similar to that of Nevo (2001) , which argued that regional average prices (excluding the city being instrumented) can be used as an instrument for the city-level price because both prices respond to the product's common marginal cost. We find that the averages are clearly correlated with a firm's ETC ---in the first stage regression, the three instrumental variables are highly statistically significant, and we will later present evidence that they appear to be strong instruments in the sense of Bound, Jager and Baker (1995) . Yet there is no strong reason why they should be correlated with other firmspecific performance, controlling for the city development (and in some specifications, city dummies), industry types, firm size and age, and the extent of the product market. We have also experimented with using only the city-industry average of ETC and its square as instruments, and the qualitative conclusions remain similar.
As can be seen for columns using the GMM specifications (columns 3 to 7 for Tables 4, 5, 6 and A1), our instruments pass a variety of specification tests. The p values for the over-identifying restrictions test-Hansen's J test-are all greater than 0.10. The instruments thus appear to be orthogonal to the error term of the firm performance equations. Moreover, the instruments are 35 The district is one administrative level below the city, and the typical number of districts in a city is around 10. District government officials also have substantial discretion. 36 When we use district-industry as the unit to compute average, there are some singleton cells. In those cases we replace those cells with the city-industry average. 37 The quadratic term for the district-industry level average is not included because it does not have predictive power in the first stage regression. The remaining three terms are all statistically significant. reasonably strong in the sense of Bound, Jager and Baker (1995) . The F-test statistics for the null that the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero are almost always greater than 10, and the marginal R squares are also quite reasonable relative to those in the specifications of Bound, Jager and Baker (1995) that yield reasonable IV estimates.
The sample used consists of firm-years with no missing variables.
38 Our time-varying variables include firm performance, firm size, firm age and tax burden. Other variables are sampled only once so they are time-invariant. To take advantage of both types of variation, we used two years of data for each firm. To take into account potential within-firm correlation of the error term and to avoid overstating the precision of the estimations, we report the White-corrected standard errors. In some specifications we also rely only on one year of observations to see if this impacts the results. The results for Profits/Sales (POS) are reported in Table 5 , and those for the Cobb-Douglas l;production function (using log value added as the dependent variable) are in Table 6 . In the case of productivity estimation, the coefficients on the interaction terms of industry dummies with the two production factors (log capital stock and log labor) are not reported in order to conserve space, and their coefficients appear sensible.
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In both tables we also use industry dummies. For each dependent variable, we present two specifications corresponding to Equations (9) and (10). In column 1 we also present a specification that leaves out ETC/Sales with the goal of evaluating whether estimates of other variables are significantly affected by the potentially endogenous ETC.
[Tables 4-5 About Here]
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For the most part, the control variables i Z and i X have the expected effects on firm performance. The regression results are reported in Table 4 on profitability and Table 5 on productivity. Firms located in more advanced regions, those characterized by higher GDP per capita, have higher average POS (Table 4 ) and much higher productivity (Table 5) . Larger firms tend to have higher POS, and older firms lower POS. Firms that sell to other provinces have higher, though largely statistically insignificant, POS and significantly higher productivity levels. Consistent with 38 In addition, we also cleaned the data slightly. For instance, we deleted 61 observations with implausible values of Profits/Sales (POS). For the value added regressions, we dropped 1% of observations with negative or zero value added; this was necessary to take the logarithm of the value added.
39 The industry-specific coefficients of production factors tend to be significant, and most sectors exhibit constant or decreasing returns to scale.
Proposition 2 of our model, a firm's relationships with its suppliers and clients have a strong effect on both POS and productivity. Increasing a firm's strength of private contracting relationship by one standard deviation (0.33) increases POS by roughly 2 to 3 percentage points, and productivity by 0.13 to 0.14. The estimates, based on the OLS and the GMM specifications, appear to be quite stable. This finding suggests that private contracting relationships are very valuable to firms in China, which is likely attributable to the nation's weak contracting enforcement.
The two corporate governance variables have some effect on firm performance, but the direct effects appear to be at most modest. Private ownership has a strong positive effect on POS.
Increasing private ownership by one standard deviation (0.46) increases POS by 4 to 5 percentage points, which is a fairly large effect. However, private ownership does not appear to directly affect productivity, as the coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant. The managerial dismissal dummy variable has a statistically insignificant effect on POS, but a robust positive effect on productivity. Firms with a previous managerial dismissal have a productivity premium of 9 to 15 percentage points.
Interestingly, though the tax burden does not appear to have a robust relationship by itself with POS, it has a robust and negative relationship with productivity. The tax burden is statistically insignificant for POS (Table 4) , whether or not ETC is treated as endogenous, and regardless of whether ETC is included in the regression. For the productivity equation (Table 6 ), the tax burden affects productivity negatively. Even when ETC is treated as endogenous, the tax burden remains statistically significant, though the magnitude decreases. By the GMM estimate in column 3, increasing the tax burden by one standard deviation (0.097) would reduce productivity by a modest 12 percentage points.
In contrast with the tax burden, ETC has robust and negative effects on both POS and productivity, with statistically significant coefficients in three of the four specifications. For POS, increasing ETC by one standard deviation (0.062) reduces POS by 8 percentage points for the OLS specification. Once the endogeneity of ETC is controlled for, the corresponding effect is 11 percentage points. Similarly, increasing ETC by one standard deviation (0.062) reduces productivity by 0.22 (0.45) based on the OLS (GMM) estimate. The negative and strong effect of ETC on firm performance-an effect that is much more pronounced than that of the tax burden-indicates that ETC on average contain more managerial own consumption than expenditures on building contracting relationships with suppliers and clients or bribes to government officials. It also suggests that in addition to the direct costs of entertainment expenditures, there are likely substantial indirect costs. These costs likely include time and attention of top managers on wining, dining, golfing, and the like.
Estimations of Equation (11) provide more insight on the effect of ETC on firm performance.
In columns 4 of Tables 4 and 5, we allow the effect of ETC on firm performance to depend on corporate governance and the strength of private contracting relationship. In columns 5 of Tables 4   and 5 we further allow the effect of ETC to depend on government expropriation, and government help. The results clearly demonstrate that the effect of ETC on firm performance hinges on these variables from our model.
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Using the results of the GMM estimation from columns 5 in Tables 4 and 5 Table 6 calculates the marginal effects of ETC/Sales on firm performance from results in columns 5 of Tables 4 and 5. As shown in Table 6 , both of these estimates are statistically significant. Again, there is strong evidence of a negative effect of ETC on firm performance. Now we examine how individual environmental variables affect the relationship between ETC and firm performance. First consider the extent of government expropriation and government quality. The interaction term of ETC with tax burden is positive for both performance measures (see columns 5 in Tables 4 and 5 ). From Table 6 , the magnitudes appear to be economically significant based on the GMM estimates. Increasing the tax burden by one standard deviation (0.097) would 40 In empirical implementation, we do not include ETC times the dummy of selling to other provinces because it is never statistically significant in any specification. apparently more than offsets the reduction in managerial consumption of ETC, and leads to an overall increase in ETC.
When the private contracting relationship is strong, the effect of ETC on firm performance appears to be more negative. percent. Thus, when firms already have stronger private contracting relationships, the marginal return to ETC is smaller, leading to lower investment in ETC. This is consistent with our findings in Section 4 and the theoretical predictions from Section 2.
Sensitivity Checks
As we mentioned earlier, the main specifications use two years of data per firm. Since we only have one year data on our key variable, ETC, we check whether the results are sensitive to using only the last year of the data. In Columns 6 of Tables 4 and 5 , we use only the last year of data from each firm to re-estimate specification the specification in Column 5. As we can see, the results in the two columns are very similar, both in terms of magnitude and precision.
Another concern is that the results may be driven by city-level heterogeneity. We have controlled for the level of development of the firm's home city with municipal log GDP per capita.
However, there may be other city-wide factors that matter for firm performance which may cause omitted variable bias. Column 7 addresses this concern by including city dummies in our control variables, and the qualitative results remain the same, though the estimation errors increase somewhat for the POS results. This is not surprising since the X variables have important city-level variation. These results show that the effects of ETC and of interactions between ETC and X hold even if we focus on variation within city-industry cells.
Our estimates of the productivity equation are robust with respect to the functional form of the production function. Table 7 assumes the translog functional form-that is, we allow for quadratic terms of production factors and their interactions, and sector-specific production functions-and we obtain estimates related to ETC and their interaction terms with X very similar to those in the Cobb-Douglas case. In addition, using capital, labor and intermediate inputs to explain output, results in Table A .1.show that this output framework gives similar qualitative results, though the precision of the estimates declines.
In summary, our analysis of the effects of ETC on firm performance provides strong support for our earlier findings about the composition of ETC. A significant portion of ETC is bribes to government officials, both for protection against excessive expropriation and in exchange for better government service. Accordingly, in situations with more severe government expropriation and a lower quality of government service, entertainment expenditures tend to be higher and have a higher marginal return to firm performance. Managers also spend a large chunk of entertainment expenditures on themselves. This is evident from the fact that ETC have a significantly negative effect on firm performance. These qualitative results are fairly robust to various functional forms, samples, and control variables.
CONCLUSIONS
Using a large sample of Chinese firms, we have documented that entertainment expenditures are quantitatively important for Chinese firms. With detailed information and hard measures related to corruption from our dataset, our analysis of the composition and effect of ETC clearly shows that a significant portion of entertainment expenditures are thinly disguised bribes to government officials, both for protection against excessive government expropriation and for better government services.
At least for China, our findings indicate that both property rights institutions and contracting institutions in the sense of Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) are important for economic performance.
To curb corruption and reduce associated social waste, reforms are necessary to make governments clean and efficient.
Clearly corruption payments for protection against government expropriation can only increase social waste. But can "grease money" corruption used to buy better government services be "efficient grease" as some scholars have argued? In our case, overall entertainment expenditures have strikingly negative effects on firm performance. In itself, however, this cannot be taken as evidence against the efficient grease argument. First, as we showed, a large chunk of entertainment expenditures are the managers' own consumption, which necessarily hurts firm performance.
Secondly, we do find that ETC have a much more positive effect on firm performance when government expropriation is very severe or when the quality of government services is very low, suggesting that corruption payments via ETC can possibly improve firm performance at least in poor institutional environments. Thirdly, given the institutional environment a firm finds itself in, it should pay bribes only if paying bribes is better than refusing to pay. Thus, one should not expect to find systematic evidence that firms individually are worse off paying bribes, controlling for their institutional environments. 42 On the other hand, our evidence says nothing about the social return to corruption. It is certainly possible that corruption may be privately beneficial but socially harmful due to externalities (Bardhan, 1997) .
Thus, to evaluate the "efficient grease" argument, one must take a social welfare perspective.
Given However, it is challenging to empirically measure those indirect costs. Though these are not easy tasks, they are fascinating topics for future research.
42 For example, suppose there are two otherwise identical firms. Firm A does not pay any bribes but has better performance, while Firm B pays bribes but has worse performance. It is hard to imagine that Firm B can improve its performance simply by refusing to pay bribes. A more likely scenario is that Firm A already has relational capital with government officials (e.g., through political connections or bribes in the past) while Firm B must build it. This example illustrates the need of caution in interpreting negative correlations between corruption payments and firm performance. 43 We think that one reason behind the large and fast increasing regional inequality in China is the quality differences in regional governments. However, given the same political system and macro-level institutions, what causes the withincountry variations in government quality? From Shleifer and Vishny (1993) , one possible explanation is how city politicians (mayors and party bosses) organize and control bureaucrats in bribe-extracting. Notes.
(1). The dependent variable is entertainment and travel costs over sales;
(2). *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
(3) Estimation is by ordinary least squares.
(4) White-Standard-deviations are in parentheses.
(5) Avg. tax burden is the city-industry level average of the once-lagged tax burden; in the computation the firm itself is excluded. Notes.
(1). *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. White-corrected standard deviations are in parentheses. (2) We also control for industry dummies in each column. City dummies are controlled for in the last column. (3). For the GMM estimation, when ETC is not interacted with other variables, the instruments are the average ETC for the city-industry cell (excluding the firm itself) and its square, and the average ETC for the districtindustry cell (excluding the firm itself). When ETC is interacted with other variables (say X), the instruments additionally include the two IVs associated with ETC interacted with X. (4) The F test and partial R square in columns (4) to (7) are for the ETC regression. The interaction-terms of ETC with other variables also have their first-stage regressions; the orders of magnitudes are similar to those reported for ETC, and are not reported here. Notes.
(1). *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. White-corrected standard deviations are in parentheses.
(2). We also control for industry dummies, and the industry-specific terms of log capital and log labor. (3). For the GMM estimation, when ETC is not interacted with other variables, the instruments are the average ETC for the city-industry cell (excluding the firm itself) and its square, and the average ETC for the districtindustry cell (excluding the firm itself). When ETC is interacted with other variables (say X), the instruments additionally include the two IVs associated with ETC interacted with X.
(4) The F test and partial R square for columns (4) to (7) are for the ETC regression. The interaction-terms of ETC with other variables also have their first-stage regressions, and the orders of magnitudes are similar to those reported for ETC, and are not reported here. (v) The rows 5 to 9 are calculated with the above formula except that the sample mean of the specific variable for each row is replaced with this number plus (or minus) one sample standard deviation of this variable. Notes.
(1). *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. White-corrected standard deviations are in parentheses. (2). We also control for industry dummies, and the industry-specific terms of log capital, log capital square, log labor, log labor square, and log capital times log labor. (3). For the GMM estimation, when ETC is not interacted with other variables, the instruments are the average ETC for the cityindustry cell (excluding the firm itself) and its square, and the average ETC for the district-industry cell (excluding the firm itself). When ETC is interacted with other variables (say X), the instruments additionally include the two IVs associated with ETC interacted with X. (4) The F test and partial R square for columns (4) to (7) are for the ETC regression. The interaction-terms of ETC with other variables also have their first-stage regressions, and the orders of magnitudes are similar to those reported for ETC, and are not reported here. Notes.
(1). *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. White-corrected standard deviations are in parentheses. (2). We also control for industry dummies, and the industry-specific terms of log capital, log material inputs and log labor. (3). For the GMM estimation, when ETC is not interacted with other variables, the instruments are the average ETC for the city-industry cell (excluding the firm itself) and its square, and the average ETC for the district-industry cell (excluding the firm itself). When ETC is interacted with other variables (say X), the instruments additionally include the two IVs associated with ETC interacted with X. (4) The F test and partial R square for columns (4) to (7) are for the ETC regression. The interaction-terms of ETC with other variables also have their firststage regressions, and the orders of magnitudes are similar to those reported for ETC, and are not reported here. 
